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Abstract 
The paper develops and solves a simple model of urban Location choice when there is a location-based income external-
ity such as a tendency for schools to be better in high income areas than low income areas. In the model, households 
choose between consumption of a Location externality, paid for by rent, and consumption of ordinary goods and serv-
ices. It is shown that the extent to which groups with different incomes separate into different areas depends non-
linearly on the unemployment rates and benefit levels can lead to a rapid clustering of jobless people into Low rent 
areas. 
A recent study has shown how the rise in unemployment in 
Australia since 1975 has led to a substantial concentration of 
jobless (and poor) people in a few urban neighbourhoods 
(Gregory and Hunter, 1995). Some of the empirical findings 
of this study have been replicated in a subsequent analysis of 
the changing unemployment situation in Wellington be-
tween 1981 and 1991 (Morrison, 1997). This paper estab-
lishes a broad framework for considering the policy implica-
tions of the increased geographical concentration of jobless 
people. A simple model of location in which different types 
of people choose to live in different neighbourhoods is 
formulated and solved. The implications of this model for 
the location of unemployed people when aggregate employ-
ment patterns change are then derived. The results show that 
once benefit levels or aggregate unemployment rates change 
beyond certain levels or thresholds, rapid clustering of 
jobless people into a particular region occurs. Once this 
clustering happens, working people tend to leave the region. 
The results of the model are of interest when there is a 
location-based income externality. A location-based exter-
nality occurs if the level of utility a household derives from 
living in a particular location depends in part on the income 
of their neighbours. A location externality would occur if, 
for instance, a random pupil would do better attending a 
school in a wealthy neighbourhood than if they were to 
attend a school in a poor neighbourhood or if there were less 
crime in a wealthy neighbourhood than in a poor neighbour-
hood. An externality would also occur if it were easier for a 
random person to find a job if they lived in a wealthy 
neighbourhood rather than a poor neighbourhood. These 
types of externality have often been discussed in literature 
about ghettos and poor housing estates in the US and Europe, 
although the evidence about their importance is mixed. 
The essence of the model is a tradeoffbetween the consump-
tion of ordinary goods and services and the consumption of 
the location externality. The cost of the location externality 
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is the rent to be paid to live at a particular location, and the 
cost of transportation to get to work. Jobless people will 
typically choose to consume less of the location externality 
than working people, in part because they have less income 
and in part because their location costs are different as they 
are less concerned with transportation. 
Even though in such a model jobless people are consuming 
an optimal amount of the location externality given their 
income, several policy issues arise. First, if the externality 
concerns education or crime, the state may be providing 
inadequate levels of education (or too much crime) to certain 
urban locations even if it is providing the same levels of 
funding to all regions. This would be the case if schools in 
poor neighbourhoods are typically worse than schools in 
wealthy neighbourhoods, for instance. Three implications 
follow. First, the state may be providing a poorer quality of 
services than it deems acceptable. Secondly, the cost to the 
state may be increasing in the degree of spatial income 
inequality, and it may be the case that the state can design 
policies that deliver a set of outcomes more efficient! y if they 
take the location externality explicitly into account. Third, 
the state may be concerned that such outcomes would 
accentuate intergenerational correlation of incomes, given 
that education is a prime determinant of future income 
levels. 
A second type of policy concern would arise if the household 
decision maker choosing the residential location is different 
from the people in the household benefiting from the exter-
nality (as would be the case if the externality was related to 
schooling). The state may be concerned if it is interested in 
the welfare of all members of the household rather than just 
the decision maker. 
A third potential reason for Government interest in the topic 
is that the welfare costs associated with macroeconomic 
changes will be different if location decisions are explicitly 
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-taken into account. This will be the case even if the 
transactions costs of moving location prevent a liquidity 
constrained household from shifting to consume more of the 
location externality. 
The literature examining how individual location choices 
based upon the characteristics of neighbours can affect the 
aggregate makeup of neighbourhoods has a long lineage, 
often traced to the work of Schelling (Schelling, 1971 ). 
Along with the literature on hedonic pricing (Griliches, 
1971; Rosen, 1974) which shows how neighbourhood char-
acteristics get capitalised into property values, this literature 
has established how market discrimination can cause the 
segregation of groups with different income and social 
characteristics into different urban areas (for a review see 
Muth and Goodman, 1989). The analysis in this paper is 
derived from these ideas. The basis of the paper is a simple 
model which shows how changes in the aggregate unem-
ployment rate and welfare payments can affect location 
choice and determine overall welfare levels. 
A model of location choice 
Consider the following simplified model of location choice 
in an urban area. The model has the following features . 
1. There are three types of people: white collar and blue 
collar workers, and jobless people. Each class t = { w, b,o} earns 
a different income It = { 1..,, Ib, IJ. 
2. There are three separate residential locations l = {a. b. c}. 
3. There are two commercial locations. All white collar 
work is in the centre city (for definitiveness, closest to 
location a) and all blue collar work is at the periphery (closest 
to centre c). It costs T"'1 and 1"1 respectively to travel from 
residential location I to the white collar and blue collar 
workplaces. 
4 . The price of land in each centre, P, is an increasing 
function of the number of people who live in the centre. The 
cost of living in a particular location, or the rent, equals the 
interest rate times the price of land. 
5. There is a wealth externality W( r ,) which depends on the 
average level of wealth I"t of the people who live in the 
location. 
6. All individuals i have an independent idiosyncratic 
preference over the three locations, represented by a term EiJ· 
7. Individuals choose their location to maximise their utility 
U(.) based upon: 
(a) their location preferences EjJ ; 
(b) the location externality W( I* 1) they get; 
(c) their consumption of other goods, C. 
The solution of the model is a (9 x 1) equilibrium probability 
function no that determines the proportion of each type of 
person that lives in each location. In equilibrium everybody 
is optimising conditional on what everybody else does. Note 
that an individual's decision is affected by everybody else's 
decisions in two ways: first, because the number of people 
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who locate in each region affect the rent in that region; and 
secondly, because of type of people who locate in the region 
affect the wealth externality. 
Various functional forms can be used to generate a solution 
to the model. The easiest approach is to assume logarithmic 
preferences over consumption and Weibull distributed loca-
tion preferences, for then the model fits nicely into a 
multivariable legit framework. Consider the utility 
maximisation of an individual i of type t . 
Let 
nlto 
Nt 
N1 = Lt Titl Nt 
PI = CX() Nlal 
I*/ = Lt ntl Nr It 
L-r Tiu Nt 
* * W(l J) =I 1 
= proportion of type t locating at l 
= number of people of type t 
= number of people at location l 
= price of land at location 1 
=average income in location l 
Suppose individual utility is given by 
U(l, C, W( 1*1 )) 
= Dtl + Cj[ 
= ~OI+I3tln(C)+~ ln(W( 1*1 )) + EiJ 
= 130I+I3tln(lt- 1"1- r Pt)+l32 ln(W( l*t )) + Eii 
Then the proportion of type t people who locate in region 1 
IS 
TI11 = expCUttl. 
LJ exp(Utl ) 
This result follows from the assumption that Eii is Weibull 
distributed. 
Because each proportion ntl is a function of all other 
proportions n. a closed form solution to the model does not 
exist. The model can be solved numerically, however, by 
calculating the 9x9 Jacobian matrix for TI, and explicit 
derivatives can be calculated using the implicit function 
theorem. The model was solved numerically using a New-
ton-Rhapson procedure. 
The effect of increasing unemployment on ur-
ban location 
The model was used to calculate the effect of rising unem-
ployment on the spatial location of unemployment. It was 
initia lly calibrated as follows, with an unemployment rate of 
5 percent, and benefit rates equal to half the blue collar 
m come. 
Nw= 145 
Nb= 140 
N0 = 15 
lw = 100 
lb=80 
Io=40 
Twa=5 
Tba = 10 
r<>a=O 
TWc= 10 
rhc=5 
r<>c=O 
The solution n was found for this initial calibration, and then 
the unemployment rate was raised progressively, assuming 
that only blue collar workers lost their jobs. The model was 
solved for two different parameter values, reflecting differ-
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1996 
ent relative preferences for consumption goods and the 
location externality. In the first model, f31= 5 and f32 =5; in 
the second model consumption of goods is more highly 
valued, with f31 = 11 and 132 = 5. 
The solution to the ftrst parameterisation of the model is 
shown graphically in Figures 1-3. Graphs of the proportion 
of unemployed people living in each location, the proportion 
of people in each location who are unemployed, and the 
fraction of the total population living in each location are 
presented. Graphs for the second parameterisation were not 
included as they were very similar to the first parameterisation, 
except (as is discussed below) as unemployment increased 
unemployed people clustered in a different centre. 
In each of the two cases, a threshold effect is observed. 
Beyond a particular level of total unemployment, the extent 
to which unemployed people are concentrated into one 
location accelerates, accompanied by a drop in the total 
population of that location. The cases differ in that the 
location of the unemployment is different. In the ftrst case, 
in which the location externality is valued relatively highly, 
unemployment concentrates in region c, the centre closest to 
the blue collar work location (Figure 1). The reason is that 
this centre is furtherest away from the central city, and thus 
initially has a smaller white collar population than centre b, 
and so has the smallest initial wealth externality. As total 
unemployment rises, unemployment increases in centre c 
and employed blue collar workers move to centre b to take 
advantage of the greater location externality despite higher 
rents and higher transport costs relative to centre c (Figure 
3). 
In the second case, in which consumption is valued more 
highly than the externality, the unemployment concentrates 
in centre b. Jobless people move to this centre to take 
advantage of the lower rents, as fewer employed people (of 
both types) initially live there because of the higher transport 
costs; moreover, as unemployed people move in to centre b, 
employed people move out, further lowering the rent. 
In both cases there is a threshold (which in these models is 
about 10 percent, but which depends on the parameterisation) 
after which there is an accelerated concentration of jobless 
people in one region. It appears that after a certain level of 
joblessness in a region is reached, there is a tendency for 
employed people to move out, further accentuating the 
problem. Note that because all people have idiosyncratic 
preferences over locations, there will not be a mass migra-
tion; rather, the movement is at the margins. The stronger are 
the idiosyncratic preferences, the less moving occurs and 
thus the less acute the problems of joblessness concentra-
tion. 
The effect of benefit levels on urban location 
The effect of benefit levels on urban location can be demon-
strated by selecting an initial level of joblessness and then 
varying the income going to the jobless. In this illustration, 
unemployment of 10 percent was used, and the benefit level 
was varied from 30 to 50, compared to an income of 80 for 
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blue collar workers and an income of 100 for white collar 
workers. The m odel was solved for the same 
parameterisations as the previous case and the results are 
graphed in Figures 4-6. 
The results are s imilar to those above in that the jobless tend 
to cluster in different centres, depending on the way in which 
the location externality is valued. Nonetheless, the two 
results have considerable similarity, despite the clustering in 
different regions : in each case, once the benefit level falls 
below a particular threshold, almost all unemployed people 
cluster into the lowest rent region (Figure 4). In the first 
example, for instance, at benefit levels equal to 40, 11 
percent of the unemployed live in region a, 56 percent in 
region c, and 33 percent in region b; but when benefit levels 
are dropped to 35, all unemployed people live in location c. 
This benefit level change also sees the proportion of the 
population living in region c fall from 31.6 percent to 28.9 
percent, as flight by employed people occurs (Figure 6). 
Conclusion 
This simple model of location choice demonstrates how 
benefit levels and the aggregate unemployment rate can 
affect the distribution of jobless people in an urban area 
when there is a location-based income externality. The 
externality could be a tendency for crime to be less in rich 
neighbourhoods than poor neighbourhoods, or schools to be 
better. In the model, people choose between consumption of 
a location externality, paid for by rent, and consumption of 
ordinary goods and services; in equilibrium, people with 
high incomes tend to live together as they can afford to 
purchase more of the income externality without sacrificing 
other goods and services. The model shows that there are 
threshhold type effects, where small changes in the aggre-
gate jobless rate, or small changes in benefit and income 
levels for jobless people, can lead to dramatic clustering of 
jobless people into certain areas. The clustering occurs not 
only because the people on low incomes choose to live in low 
rent regions but because of flight of employment people 
from these regions. 
The model has policy implications if the Government is 
concerned about the consumption of the externality, particu-
larly if the externality is consumed by household members 
who are different than the household decision maker (as 
would be the case if the externality was education related). 
In this case poverty traps could result, as income constraints 
imposed by the joblessness of one generation could be 
passed onto a second generation. 
Future research 
At least three aspects of the issues examined in this paper 
could be researched further. First, the model could be 
extended to make it more realistics. For instance, it would 
be possible to model each household as having two genera-
tions, with the location externality affecting the income of 
the second generation: in this case some results concerning 
the correlation of intergenerational income could be gener-
ated. Secondly, the extent to which location externalities 
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Figure 1. Location of unemployed persons (percentage of unemployed people living in each 
region: bl=S. b2=5) 
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Figure 2. Unemployed rate by region. (percentage of people in region who are unemployed 
bl=S. b2=5) 
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Figure 3. Regional population. (percentage of total population living in each 
region: bl=S. b2=5) 
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Figure 4. Location of unemployed persons (percentage of unemployed people living in each 
region: bl=S. b2=5) 
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Figure 5. Unemployed rates by region (percentage of people in region who are unemployed: 
bl=S. b2=5) 
~ r:A ~ 111 tec)len whO we u,.,I)IOye(l Ot • 5. b2 • 5 
-o.~r-----------------------------------------------------~ 
35." r------ --
30.~ 
15.~ 
10." 
~I) --------------1 
5." 
~ 3t 32 33 34 35 36 » 38 39 ~ 4t 42 43 u •s ~ •1 q •9 ~ 
8-tent. 
Figure 6. Regional population. (percentage of total population living in each 
region: bl=S. b2=5) 
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exist and are important in New Zealand needs to be estab-
lished. Finally, the broader implications of the model could 
be tested; for instance, whether at a given aggregate unem-
ployment rate the clustering of beneficiaries has become 
more concentrated since benefit levels were reduced in 
1991. 
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